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The history of communications. in the United States is a relatively uncultivated field. 
Generalizations abound yet conceptual frameworks are few. This essay contends that 
the history of the country's dominant comtnunications netwOrks'tan be understood 
as a chapter in the history of government-business relations, otWhatcontemporaries 
Would have called political" economy. In the long nlrieteentli c~ri.niry. that began in 
1788 and ended in 1914, the .three most important communicationsnetw0rks - th~t 
~. the mail, the telegraph, and the telephone - were shaped iiot orilY, or even primar:ily; 
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by technological imperatives and economic incentives, bur also by the regulatory 
regimes in which they were embedded.' 
The adoption of the federal Constitution in 1788 marked the beginning of a new 
epoch in US public life. The federal Constitution transformed the United States into 
a representative republic in which the creation of an informed citizenry became a 
civic ideal.' This new civic mandate for political communications was institutional-
ized with the Post Office Act of 1792, a landmark in US communications policy and 
one of the most far-reaching pieces of legislation to be enacted in the early 
republic. 
The year 1914 is a logical end point for the epoch that began in 1788. This year 
marked the start of World War I, an event destined to have major consequences for 
US communications. In addition, and no less significantly, it witnessed the apogee of 
the long campaign, mosrly forgotten today, to transfer the ownership and operation 
of the telegraph and telephone from private corporations to a public agency." ' · ' ' 
The heyday of the government ownership campaign was brief. JFollowing cthe 
takeover by the federal government, of the telegraph and telephonl.dm19i1f\lj1gqverii' 
ment ownership became the target of a withering critique. This critlqu,c'j;).~pul~ized 
the still-controversial idea that communications networks were bestowticiliaiidoper~ 
ated by corporations rather than the state. The normalization of,thc ,of~'l:R!~tcsted 
idea coincided with the commercialization of radio as a broadcast· mei:li~l','ll"·i;,~c 
cumstance that would have major implications for US communicadc:ins>jnl~~~~~ 
to come. 
Historian~ of communications have long characterized the com 
the electric telegraph in the 1840s ·as a turning point in world 
they follow a convention that dates back at least as far as 1907, w 
Adams ventured this claim in his celebrated autobiographical mem(j .. 
of Henry .A#ms. Among the many social scientists to endorse tbiit~ · 
been the geographer Allan Pred (1973, 1980) and the sociologlst>ab ·., . , .. .. .·. 
(1987)i Among historians of communications, it has been an a~tlcl~fal\fysjrilre 
1973, whenJames W. Carey (1989) exploredits implications in a mW:h~e!)te1hssayciln 
"The Telegraph and .Ideology:·• Carey's thesis was elaborated '011:rb}'1!Um>Stu!Wiit 
Richard A. Schwartzlose (1989, 1990) fu the first volume of his tW'o>volum'.e :sw-.i.ey 
of the nineteenth-century newsbrokerage business, as well as by Menahtm'Bl<>ndheim 
(1994) in his monograph on the rise of ·the New York Associated Press.~ This .conven-
tion would reach a wide popular ·audience in the 1990s through a long,running 
exhibit at the Smithsonian .Institution on the "Information Age" (Tenner, 1992),'. 
The bifurcation of the history of US communications Into two epochs - pre- . 
electtical and post-electrical..; is rendered intuitively plausible by the related presump' 
tion-that, in the.pre-electrical epoch, long-distance·communications were primitive; 
il:regular, and slow. tfhis presumption is a lecture . hall perennial. Had transatlantic 
communications not been so limited, or so it is ·often observed, the Battle of New 
Orleans, in 1815 .. would never have been fought, since the protagonists would have 
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presumption is superficially plausible, it is contradicted by much of what we know 
about long-distance communications in the decades between 1788 and 1840. Much 
depends on the frame of reference, If one compares the 1788-1840 period with tlw 
years that preceded it, rather than with the years that it preceded, it no longer appear< 
quite so backward Qohn, 1994). The transformation of the informational environ-
ment·. in the early republic was so dramatic that Pulitzer Prize winning 
historianDaniel Walker Howe {2007) has contended, drawing on a raft of specialized 
studies, that it constituted a "communications revolution." (For a survey of historical 
writing on the "communications revolution" concept, see Behringer, 2006; John, 
1994). 
In no realm was access to high-speed, long-distance communications more valued 
than in trade. For merchants dealing in· agricultural stapies; access to up-to-date 
information on market trends, known colloquially•as '.'fresh news," had long been a 
priority. The most highly coveted commercial information was the price of cotton 
and wheat in Liverpool, Le Havre, and the other leading commercial entrepilts of 
Europe (Albion, 1932, 1939; John, 1994). High-speedlong-distance communications 
were so highly valued that, in 1825, a government administrator (Postmaster General 
John McLean) committed the government to outpacing any non-governmental 
carrier in the conveyance of information on markettrends{John, 1995). 
Political. information was also in high demand; especfal!y-in times of great uncer-
tainty. During the nullification controversy in•Soutl111:iaro!ina in 1832-1833, for 
example, the editors of a prominent New York Citfbased·commercial 'newspaper 
- the journal of Commerce - invested heavily iit· a Wa~m<>n, DC--New York City 
horse express in the expectation that the informationllt>jjlelded would enable them 
to outpace their rivals in the publication of dispatches ~rlgfuatingat the seat of power 
(Blondheirn, 1994, p. 19). , •< •.r> ·. o . 
The. electric telegraph is sometimes lauded as the firSrl'roediwn to divorce trans-
portation from communications .. Here, too, however,tl!e reality is more complicated. 
The differentiation of transportation from communications had been a central 
element of postal policy in the United States ever since the·establishment of the first 
mail distribution ·centers around 1800 and would be a-clefinfug feature of the optical 
telegraphs established shortly thereafter in Boston• and· New .York City· Gohn, 1995, 
Ch. 2; Z010a, Ch. 1). . .. , · ·r • 
The most elaborate optical telegraph of the age.-was invented in 1792 in France. ; · 
It was the brainchild of Claude Chappe, a .governmentifuhctionary who had been . 
enlisted by the revolutionary.regime to centralize•the circulation of information in 
Paris. The .hub-and-spoke network that Chappe established was far more elaborate 
than any optical telegraph in the United States (Holzmanii & Pehrson, 1995; 
Headrick, 2000, Ch. 6). ,Jn.fact, the US-based optical telegraphs thatChappe's inno-
vation helped inspire are best characterized as lines.-ather thai'J. networks, sip.ce;they 
had not been designed to unite the country; like their French predecessor, but, 
rather, to link the: North Atlantic sea lanes with an Atlantic'seaport. Despite these 
limitations, the US optical telegraphs were a hallmark of the,inforrttational-environ· 
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ment in the pre-1840 period. Many newspapers from these years, for example, 
carried the word "telegraph" on their masthead, a reminder of the extent to which 
the existence of the optical telegraph was common knowledge long before the 
coming of the electric telegraph. (For a related discussion, see Crain, 2003; John, 
2010a, Ch. 1.) The optical telegraph was unquestionably one of the "greatest 
improvements of modern times," declared linguist John Pickering in 1833 in a public 
lecture before the Boston Marine Society: "no means of conveying intelligence can 
ever be devised that shall exceed or even equal [its] upidity [ ... ] for with the excep-
tion of the scarcely percepnble relay at each station, its rapidity may be compared 
with that of light itself" Unfortunately; Pickering lamented, many of the techni-
cal features of this remarkable medium remained little-known: "Every one of us 
hears and reads of news by the {optical] telegraph, from day to day, without ever 
-considering, much less understanding any thing of the principles of1 this.mode·of 
communicating intelligence" (cited in John, 2010a, pp. 14--15). · · ""' 
The most important high-speed, long-distance communications .t\1edl.u'n~ci1H~e 
United States in the pre-1840 period was not the optical telegraphibµt.:the·cmaih 
The enactment of the Post Office Act of 1792 created what one might .. ¢1:\'!l.·a;l1,"P)l~' 
lican regulatory regime for the circulation of information on public .aflliriki119rl~b¢ 
,,;.;: ~·-'<··.'· •,;: ·; ,,.\,f 
founders of the republic, the creation of an informed citizenry was far.. · .' 
to be left to the vagaries of the marketplace. Instead, they entrust~i:\. 
government agency: the Post Office or what would soon become kilo 
Office Department. The mail became a "system" not only or even;p . 
of the federal government'S organizational capabilities, but also1 ·, • 
mentally; because lawmakers had invested a government agency witl).:~ 
to facilitate the low-cost conveyance of information on public alfal~~,," 
To institutionalize this civic mandate, the Post Office Act of 1792 permt: 
kinds of publications - including, in particular; newspapers - to cirll, , 
at rates far below the cost of their conveyance. In addition, and nq 1 · 
, this law permitted publishers to enter their publications into the. , , . J?§f 
office in the country; creating a polycentric informational enviro~~ ", fl .. ~!~ 
United States apart from the nation-states of Europe (Brown;• 1'9~11~~!µ1p<~~~S; 
Kielbowicz, 1989; Starr, i004). · : .. ,,,,' ;,.,,,.,'.,> 
James W. Carey(t989) has perceptively characterized commun!cations"p0licy in 
the United States as favoring the "transmission" of information over vast.distances' 
Carey aptly identified one of the. defining features of US communications, yet left 
unspecified the mechanism by which this policy was translated into practice. The 
most important of these mechanisms in the early republic was the clause of the Post 
Office Act .of 1792 that transferred control over the designation of new post routes 
from .the executive. to the legislature.c Ordinary citizens craved access to postal 
faeilities and lawmakers were quick to oblige; (For a reconstruction of the postal peti-
tioning process, see John&:: Young,2002). By 1828, the year in which Andrew Jackson 
defeatedjohn Quincy Adams to become the sixth president of the United States - an 
event often hhlled as a landmark in the. democratization of US electoral politics ,,; 
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postal administrators had established hundreds of post offices and post routes that 
could not possibly cover their cost.' 
The civic .. mandate of the Post Office Department had well-defined boundaries. 
Though the federal Constitution authorized Congress to "establish" post roads, this 
mandate was confined, at least in the states, to the designation of thoroughfares but 
not their construction. The road-building ban helps explain why stagecoach passen-
gers in the early republic complained so often about the bumpiness of their ride. The 
Post Office Department had the authority to subsidize the operation of stagecoaches, 
but not the thoroughfares over which they ran (Holmes & Rohrbach, 1983; Jaffe, 
20!0;John, 1995, Ch. 2). In the territories, in contrast, the federal governtnent's road-
building mandate was more expansive; in fact, the construction of roads was some-
times justified, at least in part, as necessary for the conveyance of the mail (Hudson, 
2010; Southerland & Brown, 1989). 
The primary limitation on postal policy in the early republic was fiscal. Lavimakers 
by 1800 had abandoned the presumption that the Post Office Department should 
return a surplus to the general treasury. In Great Britain, in contrast, fiscal considera-
tions would remain important throughout the nineteenth century. The celebrated 
1840 rate reductions known as "penny postage,"· for example, would be justified in 
large part as a revenue-generating measure. US •lawmakers had abandoned revenue 
generation by 1800. Yet not until after 1851 would they .give up on the related idea 
that the Post Office Department should breake\reit (FUiler, 1972, Chs. 2, 5). To 
balance re\lenue and expenditures without stifling nerW'orkexpansion, postal admin-
istratClrs •became increasingly bold at asserting that .thecPost Office Department 
enjoyed a legally enforceable monopoly. The soope·.of; this monopoly, in their view, 
embraced the conveyance on a regular schedule •of certain kinds of information, 
including, in particular, personal correspondence.· 'though the precise definition of 
this monopoly remained contested, few lawmakers· challenged its' constitutionality, 
and the couns mostly acquiesced Qohn, 2004). . _,.; i. 
The most expansive feature of the Post Office ,Oepar.trilerit's civic mandate con-
cerned the kinds of infonnation that it had an obligationto eonvey at a cost that was 
sufficiently low so that this information would be accessible to the entire population. 
The most favored kind of information concerned public affairs; a preference - or in 
the language of media scholar Harold A. Innis, a "bias~ ,.l that spawned huge postal 
subsidies for newspapers, government documents, magazines, and the correspond· 
ence of lawmakers. 
The Post Office Act of 1792 said nothing about the speed' with whichiriformation 
was-to be conveyed. fufortriation on public affairs; after all, enly slowly went stale. 
Commercial information, however, was a different matter. Here speed was often· all• 
important, a circumstance thatePostmaster General john· McLean -acknowledged in . 
1825 when he committed the Post Office Department to outpacingnon'govertlrtient 
carriers in the conveyance of.information on market trends·Qohn, 1995, £b,.,j!)"''"' 
McLean's gospel of speedfornished the rationale for the failed.caJJlpaign'.of..eJed, 
tric telegraph inventor Samuel F. B. Morse to graft his invention ontd ·the ·Post,Ofiae · 
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Department. Congress demurred and the telegraphwas commercialized as a private 
enterprise, decisively severing the link between the .government and the high-speed 
conveyance of information (John, 2010a, Ch. 1). Rapid delivery would remain a 
desideratum for postal administrators - and postal users - for decades to come. 
Yet never again could postal administrators boast that the mail was the sine qua non 
of speed. 
The next major expansion in the civic mandate of the Post Office Department 
came in 1845. Goaded by irate users, and challenged by non-government carriers -
the so-called "private expresses" - Congress significantly lowered the basic letter rate, 
an innovation that had the effect, as was its intention, of expanding the mandate for 
the low-cost conveyance of the mail to embrace information on personal affairs 
(Henkin, 2006; John, 2010a, Ch. 1). '° In Great Britain, postal administrators rntional' 
ized the low-cost conveyance of infurmation on personal affairs ("penriy :postage'!') 
as a fiscal measure that would increase the revenue that its post offi.Ce•teturcrred•to 
the Crown. In the United States, in contrast, this policy ("cheap postage~!.)w~·s:iust:F 
fied more broadly as a public good.11 "'t<· :·. · 
The electric telegraph would be commercialized in a regulatory regiir1ifquit:edif• 
ferent from the regulatory regime in which the mail had evolved. Yet t:hls ~~;ho 
means obvious to the first generation of telegraph promoters. These•promcllf\1!7~~'1e(i 
by Morse's business agent, Amos Kendall, envisioned the new medium:lts;a;~!\i'f§ 
of the state. And, in· particular, Kendall presumed that the telegraph, ·· 
should be operated by the Post Office Department under centraU.ll 
bring t:his about, Kendall lobbied Congress to buy out Morse's paten 
he construed as a federally guaranteed quasi-monopoly grant. 
demnrred, Kendall transformed Morse's patent rights into franchisenhll . 
on a geographical basis (John, 2010a, Ch. 3). · >• 1<><; . : ... , •. , 
.The ''supervening necessity" for the establishment of a telegrapl\::de~-
1840s was not the railroad - as it had been in Great Britain, acco~-"a 
scholar Brian Winston (1998, Ch. 1) <-but, rather, merchant demandfdr111\il~itl 
information on market trends.12 The commercial information t:hat K'endlil~SUffi:&d 
to be the most valuable concerned the market price in Europe for cottolt!~i\vhl!~t; 
the same kind of information whose· conveyance Kendall had tried ·~•facilitate· :a 
decade earlier as postmaster· general under Andrew Jackson (John, 20-1da;1.GbJ 3). 
The electric telegraph is sometinies tailed the "Victorian Internet'' (Standage, 
1998) . .This characterization is superficially apt, since the electric telegraph and the 
Internet each utilized electricity as a mo,tive power and each relied for their operation 
on a cadre of highly skilled "online" technicians." Yet it is both anachronistic and 
misleading. In reality; the electric teleg.aph· and the Internet have remarkably little 
in common. Though the telegraph netWork was, in theory, open to anyone, in prac· 
rice, ·telegraph· rates •were sufficiently high, and telegraphic facilities sufficiently 
limited, that it remained restricted to an. exclusive' clientele. Surprisingly little would 
change in the period between the opening"ofthe fast telegraph office in 1845 and 
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Internet" existed in the nineteenth century- that is, a mediu~ designed to provide 
the entire population with the necessary facilities to circulate point-to-point informa-
tion over long distances and at high speed - it was not the electric telegraph, but 
the mail. 
Kendall's patent-rights-oriented business strategy sparked a concerted opposition 
that doomed it to collapse. Rival promoters ridiculed Kendall's plan to make Morse's 
patent rights the cornerstone of a legally sanctioned monopoly, newspaper editors 
warned about the implications of the new medium for commerce, and lawmakers 
concurred (John, ZOIOa, Ch. 3). 
Among Morse's most pointed critics were the proprietors of the principal daily 
newspapers in New York City. Troubled by the potential implications of the electric 
telegraph for the newspaper business, they banded together to form a news broker-
age called the New York Associated Pcess (NYAP). Contrary to what seems to be a 
common impression among historians of communications, the beginnings of the 
NYAP predated the Mexican-American War. Aprimary catalyst was the challenge to 
the New York City newspaper press posed by Samuel Colt, a Morse licensee who, in 
1845, established the first electric telegraph line in New York City. Colt's electric 
telegraph, like the optical telegraph that it supplanted; ·linked the North Atlantic sea 
lanes to the city's merchant elite. It was designed;· <>r so Colt boasted in a promotional 
broadside that he issued explaining its rationale/ to: supersede the New York City 
newspaper press by transmitting information directly from the sea lanes to the coun-
try's major commercial centers, rendering the city'senewiipapets irrelevant as a pur-
veyor of up-to-date news (John, 2010a, Ch:· 3)., . · • ; , ·· 
The civic ideals that shaped the regulatory regime•4J whichMbrse's critics emerged 
owed less to the republicanism of the lawmakers who founded the republic than to 
the antimonopolism of merchants, rival telegraph promoters, and the newspaper 
press. Each of these groups had by 1848 grown suspicious of the special privileges 
that lawmakers lavished on Morse arid were determined to create a political economy 
in which market competition could..flourish. Antimonopoly hastened the enactment 
of the New York Telegraph Act of 1848, a law intended to facilitate the entry into 
the telegraph business of.insurgent promoters to compete against. Morse. ·similar 
antimonopoly laws would be enacted in the following few years in almost every state. 
The regulatory regime that lawmakers established. to coordinate tlie electric tel-
egraph was not intended, like .the regulatory regime it.supplapted, to be coordinated 
'by a.single organization that;was ultimately accountable to .Congress. Rather, •it relied 
on competition to ensure that no single company dominated the informational envi-
~tonrnent. So long as it was possible for new entrants to enter .the business,·or so 
'liiwmakersreasoned,. no othedegislation was necessary to proteet the p1.1blic good. 
">~dng the beneficiaries of antimonopoly were the.promoters who established 
'o/esti:m Union, of whofi?. the most successful was .Hifam .Sibley. Unlike M0rse and 
Keridall,. Sibley did not count on federally guaranteed. patent rights to protect him 
agafusri'ti"l!al promoters. _Rather, Sibley relied on the right-of.way privileges·that·state 
lawmakers ihad :granted railroads under state law. By negotiating eirclnsive right-of, 
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way agreements with strategically located railroads, Sibley devised a busiuess strat-
egy that circumvented Morse's patent rights. Sibley's business strategy would lead 
eventually to the emergence of Western Union as the country's dominant telegraph 
company, an event that occurred in 1866. 
The antimonopoly regulatory regime in which Western Union flourished presup-
posed the existence of rivals that would keep rates down and performance standards 
high. For this reason, the emergence of Western Union as the dominant network 
provider in 1866 was for many lawmakers a cause for concern. Among these lawmak-
ers was Congressman john Sherman of Ohio. To check Western Union's power, 
Sherman sponsored a major piece of legislation that would come to be known as 
the National Telegraph Act (1866). Neither Sherman nor anyone else in 1866 regarded 
Western Union as a "natural monopoly" that owed its dominant position in •the 
telegraph business to technological imperatives and economic incentives. This ds 
worth underscoring, since in the twentieth cenrury this anachronlstic<characteriza; 
tion of the post-1866 telegraph business would become the conventional wisdom 
among business historians. The "natural monopoly" hypothesis, for cxamplc,fi&'llres 
prominently not only in Robert Luther Thompson's Wiring a Conti1tctit (ll!A.7);'.bµt 
also in Alfi:ed D. Chandler,Jr.'s Visible Hand (1977)." · · ••<'.iiefi\jl!f!~ 
The National Telegraph Act was the federal counterpart to the many.Stati!"tl;;la 
graph acts that had been modeled .on the. New York Telegraph 'Alili'ig.. ~§( 
Compliance was voluntary. No telegraph company was obliged to· '· 
several; including Western -Union, briefly held out. Every telegraph• 
did sign on was guaranteed certain privileges. In .rerurn, these telegraph' 
agreed to permit Congress to buy. them out at a mutually agreed-uponip 
convey information fur federal government agencies at rates to be deter 
postmaster general Oohn, 201 Oa, · CIL 4). 
. The initial refusal of• Western Union to assent to· the National Te 
not surprising. After ;all, the priinary rationale fur the law was to open~" . : 
gmph business to new entrants. Harder to explain was the willingn~li.M 
Sibley in 1867 to abide by its provisions. Though Sibley had by this·•~-steppe'd 
down as Western·Union'.s president, no company official ever q11estlonetlitlii'ellegafit¥ 
bf. his decision. Why Sibley signed on is a matter of conjecture. It is coneeivable'1:hat 
he assumed that the law would prove advantageous to the company's shareholders, 
s.ince it included a provision that protected their rights. It is also possible·th>1t Sibley 
feared that, if Western Union did-not acquiesce, the US army might no.t defend its 
assets in the former Confederate states Oohn, 2010a, Ch. 4). 
1Wl'he primary· benefito£ .the National· Telegraph Act for. telegraph companies was 
access to rights-of-way: In theory,' assenting telegraph companies would hencefur.th 
hav;e 1the right to string telegraph wires: along any routes in the country that had 
\>,eiin.;designated a post. routeo Had the courts .construed the right-of-way clause 
broadly;· Western Union would have been. highly -vulnerable to insurgent network 
~rl!ividers, since the company relied heavily on exclusive right-of-way contracts to 
block would-be rivals from contesting key markets ... With one exception, however; 
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the courts <:onstrued this privilege quite narrowly. The exception occurred in the 
late 1870s when, in a succession of right-of-way cases, the <:ourts ruled against 
Western Union and in favor of financier Jay Gould, who was then an insurgent tel· 
egraph promoter, facilitating Gould's ultimately successful raid on Western Union. 
Following Gould's takeover of Western Union in 1881, jurists reverted to the narrow 
construction of the right-of.way clause that had prevailed prior to Gould's raid (John, 
20!0a, Ch. 4). 
The primary benefit of the National Telegraph Act for the government was rate· 
setting. In keeping with the anti-interventionist logic of the antimonopoly regulatory 
regime, telegraph companies· had the right to charge whatever rates they pleased. 
(Postal rates, in contrast, continued to be set by Congress; telephone rates would 
also be highly regulated, at first primarily by city <:ouncils.) One exception to this 
anti-interventionist logic was the federally funded telegraph line that -contractors 
built in conjunction with the Pacific Railroadc 
A second exception was the rate-setting ·clause of the National Telegraph Act. 
Every telegraph company that assented to this law was henceforth obliged to trans-
mit telegraphic dispatches for federal government agencies at rates to be determined 
by the postmaster general. This might seem like a minor matter. In fact, a government· 
mandated rate cap made it economically feasible, for the fu-st time, to forecast 
weather patterns with a fair degree of precisio~ Weather forecasting in the post-1866 
period was a specialty of the US Signal Service; the-go;vernlnent agency that had 
provided logistical support fur the army during the;CivilrWru:,c .Now that the war 
had ended, the signal service cast about for·something·rtmdo. •.1;Jie government· 
mandated rate cap made it possible forthe signal- seniice not only t<> collect the vast 
amount of weather-related data necessary to•forecast the weather but also to circu-
late this information throughout the country; a major boon for commerce." 
The congressional buy-out clause in the NationalTelegraph Act had a far-reaching 
influence on the operations.of the !telegraph network. Everyone conversant with the 
bnsiness understood that all ofrthe;major network providers - including Western 
Union - had consented to permitCpngress to purchase their assets at any point five 
years after its enactment. The purchase price was to be agreed upon by five commis-
sioners - two of whom were selected by the government, two by the company; and 
the fifth by the other· four, ' . 
·Congress never exercise& the huy-out option. Eyen so, .the fatt that by 1867 every 
major telegraph company iri .the country had asserited ·to a -congressional buy-out 
would have major implications· for the policy debate•ovebthe telegraph network. 
Most obviously; the buy-outclatiseinsured that this debate•wduld-revolve'primarily 
arouhd ·practical matters, such as the relative merits ·of government ado;tinistration 
and corporate management,. rather than the. broader; moi,:e . ideologically fraught 
lssueLof.the proper relationship of capitalism, socialism; and democracy Interestingly; 
ftwmiticsdetjdeda congressional buy-out of the tclcigraph network as un·American 
or unconstitµtional, a . charge that critics would almost certainly have voiced had 
lawmak.ersrattei;npted:anything comparable-after World War!. 
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The buy-out clause also shaped the market for telegraph securities. Telegraph 
investors understood that, if Congress bought them out, they were certain to net a 
handsome profit. Not surprisingly; it was widely rumored in the press that major 
Western Union investors, including the prominent railroad and steamship magnate 
Cornelius Vanderbilt, had secretly endorsed the buy-out and were lobbying behind-
the-scenes to bring it about (fohn, 201oa, Ch. 4)_ 
The consequences of the buy-out clause were by no means confined to telegraph 
investors. So long as a buy-out remained even a remote possibility, speculators in 
telegraph securities could boost the price of Western Union shares by floating cred-
ible rumors that Congress was about to act. It was equally easy to depress the price 
of Western Union shares. All a speculator had to do was to float a credible rumor 
that Congress intended to back a rival network provider (fohn, 2010a, Chi 5). 
No one proved more adept at manipulating the price of Western -Unlon»shares 
than Jay Gould. To roil the markets, Gould relied not only on the business'1PteSS( 
which was easily influenced, but also on lawmakers, whom he had llti:!e•ttoublt!: 
recruiting, and the courts, which proved equally malleable. To enhance his•t:tecllbilityi 
Gould invested in rival telegraph companies and in telegraph-related pateii.6rights,c 
For a brief period in the mid-1870s, a full-scale bidding war erupted betwee1t(J:o~ld, 
and Western Union president William Orton over the patent rights toinvCndt!:ii: fiat 
might conceivably prove useful in the telegraph business. The resultingli!if : 
neurial hothouse - a byproduct of the antimonopoly polltical econom: · 
Gould flourished - generated, in short order, four of the most notable• 
of the century: namely; the broadband telegraph; the telephone; the• 
and the electric power station (fohn, ZO!Oa, Ch. 4). i,-
Gould's takeover of Western Union in 1881 transformed the com 
scape. Astonishingly, the country's most outspoken antimonopolist lt\t 
emerged as the largest. shareholder in the country's dominant telegrap. 
provider. Gould's sudden emergence as a communications magnate trotjb! : 
from all across- the: political spectrum. In no sense was it a partisan lssu ;. · • 
were outraged and so too were Republicans. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 1G.o~d .. 
ancy proved especially unsettling to the small yet influential c~~bfiJb~cy 
merchants; bankers, and wholesalers who sent telegrams and invested;diaicotpl!lra'te 
securities. , 1fd•i·r1 1'Yi··:it»-,11f::: 
Congress. would not enact a major piece of telegraph legislation un!il ~9 Hl; lmthat 
year, it•deaeed for the first time that the telegraph and telephone, were common 
carriers; .a legal term of art that carried with it the strong presumption thatr<like 
railroads and package carriers, they•would be subject to permanent regulatory over, • 
sight to ensure that the interests:of their investors were aligned with the public good. 
Yetthedie hadbeenciastwithGould'stakeoverofWestern Union in 1881. No longer 
was it plal<Slble to cont\l]ld, as it has been during. the heyday of the antimonopoly 
era between 1848 and 1881; that the only regulat<>try'• mechanism necessary to-~ 
the telegraph business with the public good, was the enactment of legislati9n to 
encourage: new: entrants to:challenge incumben~s,' To underscore this subtle-yet 
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momeritcius intellectual sea-change, the political economist Richard T Ely popular-
ized a new concept. The telegraph business, Ely contended in 1888, was a "natural 
monopoly" that, as a result of its history, was impervious to competition. Ely did not 
popularize this concept to bolster the case that the telegraph was best coordinated 
as a ·managerial corporation, anticipating, as it were, the twentiethweentury business 
historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. Rather, he .floated it to strengthen the case for gov-
ernment ownership (John, 2010a, Ch. 5). 
Politics had artifacts, to invert the well-known formulation of political philosopher 
Langdon Witmer. Telegraph companies like Western Union .flourished in an antimo-
nopoly regulatory regime in which lawmakers looked to competition to regulate 
business behavior. As a consequence, telegraph managers confined themselves to 
the most lucrative markets and rarely invested in facilities that could not be expected 
to generate a steady return. Western Union managers were particularly loath to 
presume that the telegraph, like the mail, might one day become a genuinely popular 
medium. Western Union's position was reiterated by its president, Norvin Green, as 
late as 1890. Fewer than 10% of US citizens would prefer the telegraph to "letter 
communication," Green predicted, even if the <:ost were identical (cited in John, 
201 Oa, p. 7). 
In the telephone business; as in the telegraph business, political structure shaped 
business strategy." In the telegraph business, lawmakers-repeatedly enacted legisla-
tion to encourage wouldcbe network providers. This legisla,tion created a regulatory 
regime in which, or so it was long assumed, rate regulation.was superfluous and 
performance standards best left to market demand. The.telephone business, in con-
trast, emerged in a regulatory regime that was in a dual sense progressive. Tbe regu-
latory regime was progressive not only in the . sense. that lawmakers presumed 
innovation to be more-or-less continuous and unending, but also ·in the sense that 
they rejected competition as -the primary ·regulatory mechanism. From .the outset, 
telephone operating companies held.· municipal franchises that limited entry and 
mandated rate caps and performance standards. At no point in the early history of 
the telephone business"- and not even.during the so-called "competitive" period that 
followed the .expiration orthe original telephone patent_ rights in 1894 - was open 
entry the norm.17 On the contrary, lawmakers regarded access to the network for 
new users to be a superior measure of network performance to access to the network 
for would-he network providers." · Tbe progressive regulatory •regime obligf;!d tele-
phone companies to meet performance ·standards far strider.than" the perfor111ance 
standards that the antimonopoly regulatory regime had reqUired· of telegraph ·com-
panies. -In return, it promised a more stable operating environment that pmved in 
,practice to be highly conducive.to technical advance;• 
,,,,,·;£'he commercial-potential of'the telephone had•been•established by 1878. Not 
-~uvprisingly, -given the widespread recognition that the new business ·:was likely to 
'Pr¢'e-lua:ative, a.brief c<impetitivestruggle ensuedhetween Western Unionahd a 
groupof-p_r:omoters whose most valuable _asset 'Wl!s the patent rights .that the federal 
government: has.. assigned to telephone inventor Alexander Graham Bello, Tbe two 
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rivals cut a deal in the following year, and Western Union bowed out. For over 100 
years - that is, from 1879 until 1984 - the dominant telephone network provider in 
the United States traced its origins to the investor consortium that coalesced around 
Bell's patent rights. 
The telephone business was more variegated than the telegraph business. Of the 
various institutions spawned by Bell investors, three were of special importance. 
These were the Bell-associated holding company that controlled the portfolio of 
patent rights around which the business evolved; the long-distance Bell-associated oper-
ating company, which was, early on, a money loser; and the local Bell-associated 
operating companies, which were for many decades at the center of the' network. 
Much confusion has been caused by the mistaken presumption that the telephone 
business in its formative era was centrally controlled by the Bell-assodatedc\lolding 
company, which, after 1900, would be known as the American Telephqne and 
Telegraph Company, and which would eventually come to be known by:.iwacrgnym; 
AT&T. In fact, the most consequential innovations in the pre-1914 perlod:bbq11rretl 
in the Bell-associated operating companies, of which the most imporhlnj;;,:Were 
located in New York City and Chicago Uohn, 201oa, Ch. 8; Maguire, 2000; Well)lari; 
2004).19 
The second competitive interlude in the telephone business occurred_':·· 
that immediately followed the expiration of Bell's original patent rights,ll1 
the first competitive interlude, it was rapid, consequential, and short-lived" 
lar, it witnessed the emergence of a rival, non-Bell consortium of telepho 
companies that would become known as the "independents." The ind¢$! 
their own equipment mannfacturers, trade association, and trade press'~­
around 1900, peaked in 190hand were rescued by lawmakers in 1913, vi 
many similar ventures in US business history, of a fatal combination 0£ 
overconfidence and speculative finance. 
The rise of the independents underscored the pent-up demand'~ 
service. that the Bell,associated operating companies had failed to mee~~ · 
previous 15 ·years. Independent promoters were emboldened not onlY"by-itlt~.dst! 
ence of this demand,. but. also by a sympathetic legal environmel}t.' &1adrtJiim!o1µw~ 
be<;!n so inclined, they could have defined broadly the many patentr.rlgh.ts<tlhatfilie 
Bell holding company retained. In addition, they might have babned· .thei:exclusive 
fnarket-Sl'gffienting interconnection agreements that independents entered info With 
ttaclLother to strengthen their 'competitive position. Yet the-· courts did not: In· so 
dming; they segmented the market' fortelephone service; and created the highly con' 
uwdd,competitive conditions in which the independents emerged. 
'lil!I1hlj!xapid expansion of the telephone business in the post-1894 period is of great 
s!gtirifican€e,for sttldents of US W1Ilmllnications. The telephone was the first electri-
&ll;lmoinmUnication rnedii!tmto be ,remnfigured to become accessible not only to an 
exclusive·clientele ...;·Jike,.for1e><:ainple, the telegraph ~.but also to the entire popula-
tidl;i;,Ln1tlm.United:States,'this recmµiguration began in the late 1890s and was mostly 
complete by 1907 (John, 2010a, Ch. 8). 
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The popularization of the telephone \Vas a byproduct of t\vo related yet distinct 
developments. The first was the rise of the independents. Thousands of citizen> 
made their first telephone call on an independent telephone, partly because the 
independents were quick to cover tbe field, and partly because they ordinarily offered 
lower rates than tbeir Bell rivals (Mueller, 1993, 1994). 
· The second and even more consequential development was the re-engineering of 
the big-city telephone exchange. Expansion posed an unusual problem for telephone 
managers tbat differentiated the telephone business from most otber businesses with 
which it might be compared. Ifa manufacturer doubled his output, it was taken for 
granted tbat he could find ways to reduce his unit costs. In the telephone business, 
however, tbe situation was very different. Telephone switching was expensive and, 
in this period, every Bell-associated telephone exchange was operator-assisted. That 
is, it required tbe intervention of a telephone company employee - almost always a 
young woman - to complete the connection. If tbe size of the exchange doubled, 
tbe number of connections increased fourfold, obliging tbe telephone company to 
increase tbe size of its staff, and, in certain cases, upgradeits switching equipment 
(Mueller, 1989). To make matters even more complicated, telephone rates in the 
largest operating companies, including New York City and Chicago, were set not by 
the company; but by tbe government agency tbat had jurisdiction over tbe territory 
in which it operated. In New York City; tbe government agency was tbe state legis-
lature; in Chicago, tbe city council. 
Had big-city operating companies charged by the call, increased revenue would 
have offset at least part of the costs of expansion. Unfortunately for tbe companies, 
witb a few minor exceptions, tbey did not. In large part, tbis was because, early on, 
users preferred a fixed (or. "flat rate") calling plan tbat provided tbem witb an unlim· 
ited number of calls inside a particular.territory (John, ZO!Oa, Chs; 6--7). 
Flat rates were a good deal for heavy users, tbe vast majority of whom were busi· 
nessmen. But tbey were too high to appeal to non-business users, a potentially huge 
market tbat at tbis time remained untapped. By championing. flat rates, big users 
defended a .rate structure .• tbat slowed, and in some instances blocked, telephone 
popnlarization. Big-user preferences also exerted a subtle influence on·the writing of 
telephone history by fostering tbe mistaken presumption tbat ordinary people 
opposed measured- service (Fischer, 1992; Lipartito, 1995).20 · · 
Under tbe circumstances, telephone operating company managers had -good 
reason to keep tbeir exchanges small. Why; then, did tbey expand? In New York City 
•·and Chicago, two reasons loomed uppermost. First, .managew feared government 
; regulation and regarded network .expansion as a counterweight,_ ff tbe• user base 
\exp@ded, a larger percentage· of the electorate• v.:-oltld h:avlLan intefl'St in telephone 
service. Becond, they recogrtized .that it might be-possible to increase revenue if they 
could recruit new users willing to •experiment .witlhmvel calling plans. that linked 
usag~. -with cost. These calling plans -' which,-·c9llectively; were termed measured 
sevvice . .,of!ered users a variety of options that:greatly,increased•the· attractiveness 
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of the medium for users who would never have considered paying a single }.i.l_gh fixed 
rate (John, 2010a, Ch 8). 
The outcome of network e:cpansion was dramatic. The New York City telephone 
exchange had 9,627 telephones in 1895 and 361,302 in 1910; the Chicago exchange 
had 11,680 in 1895 and 239,083 in 1910. Much of this expansion occurred in residen-
tial districts, a sector that telephone managers had not much cultivated prior to this 
time. Almost all of the new users signed up not for flat-rate .service but for some 
kind of measured service. In this way, the telephone companies were able to recoup 
some of the costs of network expansion (John, 2010a, Ch. 8). 
The fact that no comparable expansion occurred in this period in Toronto, Canada 
is revealing. In Canada, the national government prevented municipal or provincial 
authorities from regulating telephone rates. As a consequence, company managers 
had less of an incentive to expand. 21 • ' : 
Network expansion blunted political pressurefor potentially ruinous rate cap~:;°X"~t 
ithad its own risks. What if a new medium emerged that provided users withp,~i°'f,. 
to-point real-time communication, but which did not require the enormousdI\'Y<i~;\J,,· 
ment in a wire networkl This risk troubled the managers of the holding company 
that had invested in the Bell-associated operating companies and led them in the ~aj'ly 
1900s to embark on an ambitious research-and-development program. Thegi:lal_~f;, 
this program was to obtain patent rights to a new medium called wireless teleg~~~l;o/';; 
that was being rapidly commercialized in the United States by the Italian inl{/l .• ,,,,. 
Guglielmo Marconi. 
Wireless telegraphy evolved into radio, a medium long regarded prima ' 
form of broadcasting. In the early 1900s, however, it seemed far more · 
radio would be commercialized iis a point-to-point medium in direct co 
with the telephone .. Researchers funded by Bell's holding company wor ' 
ously to parry this challenge, fearful that, if they did not, their huge inves~ 
wired telephone network would become worthless. 
For technical, economic, and. political reasons, these fears proved unw~~ , 
Bell's research• agenda would, .however, have unanticipated consequenae~.i-~ll-t, ·" ,., 
shape its business strategy. Research on .wireless telegraphy led Bell eiJ8~1!ilsl ti) 
invent a device that cowd amplify an electrical signal, an invention that hll!tdtjari,iij\>£ 
technology hail as the advent of electronics. Tills device - the three-elerp,e,nt•vacuu'.\fl 
tube - ·enabled Bell engineers to link New York City and San Fran.ciscd •in.a• single 
transcontinental telephone network, a feat they achieved in 1915. ', · " 
The significance of transcontinental telephony is easily misconstrued. Bell public 
relations announcements trumpeted.it as a public good with momentous economic, 
cultural, and political implicatioru.221 A multitude of AT&T-centric Bell staffers, his' 
torians, and .social scientists have followed their lead· (Auw, · 1983; Boettinger, 1983; 
Galambos, 1992;. Latour, 1987; Pool, .1983;• Pool, Decker, Dizard, Israel, Rubin, & 
Weinstein, 1977; Smith; 1985).fa.factrthe primary significance of transcontinental 
telephony in its early.years was prom0ti0t)al. ·By linking Bell with technical advance; 
,, 
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it blunted the oft-voiced critique that Bell was technically backward. This public rela-
tions benefit more than offiet the cost of maiotaining the long-distance network, 
which was considerable. 
Transcontioental telephony played little role in the contest between Bell and its 
independent rivals. This contest peaked-in 1907, long before the line was completed. 
Two events io 1907 proved especially critical io doomiog the iodependents' challenge. 
The first was the collapse of a major iodependent-backed combioe, the United States 
Independent Telephone Company·of Rochester, New York. This collapse made it 
virtually impossible for other independents to raise revenue io the financial markets, 
a crippling blow. The second wastl\.e.recharteriog of the Chicago Telephone Company 
by the Chicago city c'buncil, an event that signaled the demise of antimonopoly as a 
solution to the problems that economic consolidation posed (John, 2010a, Ch. 9). 
The collapse of United States Independent ind the recharteriog of Chicago 
Telephone preceded the return to Bell of Theodore N .. Vail;the telephone executive 
who would serve as president of American Telephone Company from 1907 until his 
death io 1920. Beginning in 1878, Vail had held various posts at a number of Bell-
associated operatiog companies, before leaviog the telephbne business io 1889. In 
1907 Vail returned. The timing of Vail's return is worth underscoriog, sioce many 
AT&T-centric historians credit Vail with ioventing the busioess strategy that would 
lead to the emergence by 1913 of the telephone busioess as a regulated monopoly 
io which Bell· enjoyed a domioant position, an. outcome that would .stabilize the 
telephone business for the next 70 years. In fact, Vail would not re,enter the telephone 
busioess until afrer telephone service had been popu1arized1 an •event that occurred 
between 1894 and 1907, when he was out of the busioess-. 'Fhekrelevance of Vail to 
the popularization of the telephone has been.deliberately underplayed by AT&T-
sponsored corporate hagiography and the .scholarShip that has •given· it •academic 
legitimacy, both ()f which invested Vail with ilmost divin,e powers as the savior of 
the telephone network over which he would preside for 13 years. 
The events of 1907 posed a major.dilemma for independent promoters, investors, 
and equipment manufacturers. Henceforth, it would prove very difficult for them 
to obtain the necessary venture capital to rem'ain viable rivals to BelL How, then, 
might they protect their own investment in a fixed-wire telephone network? Two 
options suggested themselves:· First, they might sell out to Bell.· This soh;tion was 
economically attractive, yet politically problematic. Pro-llJ,dependent.Jawmakers 
might disallow the merger• as .anticompetitive, wmk·therreinaining independents 
would warn that the sale to Bell: of any iodependent property•would weaken their 
own investment, since, at .. this time,· the interconnectionofdilell and-independent 
telephone networks remained a matter of cont'estation:' l< • • · 
:HThe second option was to• mobilize the state•to .. insulate the mdeperidents• from 
the market. This option appealed to a.small but influential cohort of uncomprol'.11is' 
in.g• independents; most of ~hi ch were relatively; modest in: size, that refused •t-O 
negotiateiwith Bell, . the preferred strategy ·for1the)arge independents. To protect 
themselves from market pressure, the uncompromisiog iodependents convioced the 
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t(~dcral justice department to reopen a lawsuit charging Bell with an.ticon1petitive 
behavior. This lawsuit led in 1913 to a settlement between Bell and the federal gov-
ernment that had been brokered by Attorney General James C. McRcynolds. The 
McReynolds settlement is sometimes misleadingly known as the "Kingsbury 
Commitment," after a Bell vice president, a convention that obscures the extent to 
which it was an independent victory and a Bell defeat. It had three main provisions. 
f1irst; it established an orderly process to facilitate the interconnection of Bell and 
independent telephone exchanges that minimized the likelihood that, if Bell pur-
chased the assets of a one-time rival, it would find itself slapped with a lawsuit charg-
ing it with engaging in anticompetitive behavior. Second, it obliged Bell to divest 
Western Union, frustrating Vail's plan to unite the telegraph and telephone in a single 
l11terlinked network, a plan that had hastened the popularization of telegrnph SerVice 
for the first time in 1910. And, third, and, for the independents, most cl'itically1 it put 
the imprimatur of the federal justice deparrment behind the Bell-independent!;;~ 
rnentation of the telephone market, making it far easier for the many fadcipel:iden'i:s 
that remained to obtain the necessary funding to upgrade their facilities (Hac\11eldetf 
2002; John, 2010a, Ch. 10; for a diflerent perspective, see Schiller, 1998). , :;' ·:·;:i';i~{fj' 
World War I marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of US •Cfll}~Jriil, 
nications. Though the United States would not enter the war until 1917, tli!!.«:i'· · 
of hostilities in Europe affected US communications in two ways. First, it-ut\d . 
the enormous importance of communications as a weapon of war. The• · ' . 
in 1914 remained a minor player in international communications. The B. ·. 
ment conttolled much of the world's international telegraph network.' 
company- Marconi- dominated radio research (Aitlcen, 1985; Headrlck.;11 
1999). Federal lawmakers regarded this situation as unacceptable and1tl! 
hasten US government control over both radio and international telegraplfy; 
appropriatedMarconi'spatentsin!917;inthefollowingyear,thePostOfficeDe!lj~Al 
assumed control of all international telegraph lines that had been land~d'~~ 
coast. The US radio business grew directly out of these wartime actions. The Radio 
Corporation of America (RCA), for manydecades a leading manufas~M'l?tt\l~? 
equipment, traced its origins to the ~atent pool that the US N~V?'.,:~t~'~!;~fki\1 
conjunction with several other interested parties, including Bell, in 1919. 'I'hr ITT.~t-~o!Il­
mercial radio broadcasts occurred in the following year (Douglas, 1 ~87) .. ·.,, , , . , . , 
World War I also witnessed a major ~hift in popular assumptio11S. reg~rding the 
relative merits of government administration and corporate management. Popular 
support for a congressional buy.out of.the telegraph and.telephone network was 
high in 1914. It was, in fact, for this reason that Bell publicists took such care to 
boost the transcontinental telephone. By demonstrating that Bell could promote 
technical advance, they rebutted oneof the major arguments for a government 
takeover. The federal government would, in fact, take over the telephone and tele-
graph'in 1917(John, 2010a, Ch. lI); Goverrun~nt administration, however, proved 
highly unpopular, dooming gov;ernm~nt o~ership as a realistic policy option. This 
faifod .exp~riffi~t h~tened tile legitihiaticm of the managerial corporation as an 
' - : '-:_-- - -,_- ,· :•, ' ,' ·-'' l'- •• 
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organizational form, an outcome that cast a long shadow not only on US communi~ 
cations, but also on the US political economy (Vietor, 1994). 
In the period between 1788 and 1914 the mail, the telegraph, and the telephone 
evolved in relationship not only to technological imperatives and economic incentives, 
but also to governmental institutions and civic ideals. The mail was reshaped beginnll1g 
in 1792 by a republican regulatory regime thatpresumed that the citizenry had a right 
to convenient access to infurmation on public affairs. By 1825, this presumption had 
expanded to embrace information on market trends; by 1845, to information on per· 
sonal matters. The telegraph was commercialized in a political economy in which 
republicanism was rapidly being supplanted by antimonopoly. In the antimonopoly 
regulatory regime, lawmakers presumed that the puplic good would be best promoted 
by legislation that encouraged new entrants .to challenge incumbents. Equal access 
became associated less with citizens - as it had been, for example, in the republican 
regulatory regime - than with would-be network providers and their expectant clients. 
The telephone emerged in a political economy in which antimonopoly made little sense 
as a regulatory mechanism. In its place, lawmakers created a progressive regulatory 
regime. The fruits of technical advance, they assumed, should be accessible not only 
or even primarily to would-be network providers,and their clients, but also, and in 
particular, to end users, whom they conceptualized not as ·citizens but as consumers. 
The progressive regulatory regime remained largely'.UiJ.contested nutil the 1970s, when 
it would be challenged by a revival of antimonopoly c;tthe·intellectual rationale for the 
break-up of the Bell System in 1984 and the: ffelec~cations Act of 1996. 
Antimonopoly has not gone nucontested. Yet:it remains/tora fu1greater degree than 
republicanism or progressivism, the•halhnark of the p<>litioiWeconomy of communica-
tions in the United States today. 
NOTES 
For a more genera)_ dis~s~~~-.Q,f __ nipe_teenth-cenrurf "regulat~ry reg~es'; =~d thei~ 
potential as an organizilf~ _tiiei;iie for historians of the nine~eenth-cffitury United Siates, 
including historians of eomqu:mications, see Johil (2006) and :Be~rt (2012, esp: pp. 322, 
334-335). . . ' . . . . . 
2 Historians of commuhlc~tlortsfa tbe early US republic iiaV;, longb<!en intdghed by' the 
role of comritunic·aiioris roedia in. creating and ·sustcliitirig 'ah ·hlf6imed dfue'nry. On 
· · the concept of an inf Of med citizeriry; see Bi'own (1996). · a:n--tlie'ilifluerlte Of cori1inunica~ 
~, tions media on civic identity, see John (1995), Schuds6n '(l99S);'and rStarr {2004), For a 
ti.'): · complementary approach to the relationship between comnnihit:ations and'civics·that 
\'l ' , focuses on ideas rather tban institutions, see Wood·(200!5).,. '., , ·, · 
11Ldlspeci@y influenrial,, at least among social stjentists,,.h,.~ been Giddenss sweeping 
"e, 1 •1q!ajl;ns regarding tbe epochal signifiq.nce of the el~ct;ric felegr,.ph-in transformil:\g.con-
b· ,,;wp\j9n'jL '"!sumptions C(>nc,e~ning time, space, arn;l speed. for a relateif discussi'?n.; with 
2 , , a,411\f\?fal ~ta\jons, see Behringer (2006). . ... .. . .· . ... ·. ., ·. . ···. , . ,.. , 
('4 .. -??1~ _ ~~~~~~e~, ~eature of C.arey's essay Pfl,~~ _el~~F t~~~g~ap~ ~ -~;~:-~~-~- t? 
whlcll n1s deployment of vivid metaphors to underscore tbe world-historical significance 
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:Of the new medium rendered his essay vulnerable to his own well~known critique of 
, . the "rhetoric of the electrical sublime." For a related discussion, see Marvin (1988). 
<.l r:-Schwarzlose forused primarily on the electric telegraph as a technology; Blondheim on 
··its role in fustering novel organizational forms. My own approach shifts the focus from 
, 1·'--the electric telegraph to the political economy in which it was embedded. For a related 
discussion; see Nerone (2008). 
The Smithsonian exhibit ignored the mail entirely, at least in part because its history was 
featured in another gallery of the museum. 
):'l ''.,One diplomatic historian (Nickles, 2003) has gone so far as to make the counterfactual 
·· ; ',;claim that the existence of a -cable link between Great Britain and the United States might 
• ·. have diminished the likelihood that the United States would have declared war on Great 
,Britain in 1812. 
·The phrase "postal. system," while not unknown at this time, would not ·become 
common until mid-century. ··1,'T J'· · ~!;,1. 
9 The Post Office Department influenced electoral politics in the e:arly,1'epubUcdn two 
distinct ways. First, it created an informational environment that facill.t~ted tbe,.ri_ati.011-
wide circulation of campaign literature. Second, it provided par,ty ,lcod~rs-)Wit:h the 
material incentives -·in the form of lucrative offices and contrac~!W.0.t:O'.~r¢W!lrd-··patty 
workers should their candidate prevail. See John (1995, Ch. 6; 200:1)i»\.(,;i;(li;11i\n;;l;l:!;;,,:,;' 
10 The letter-rate reductions mandated by the Post Office Acts of 184$, al\Q'illf5A,~\ilJ.t;l)i\\ 
and.extended, the highly advantageous newspaper rate structure estlib . . · . 
Office Act of 1792. The mid-century postal reform acts hastened a .. 
. tions revolution; the fir.st communications, revolution dated from- thei 
11 • Though the civic rationale for communications regulation in the Uni 
expansive than the -fiscal rationale for communications regulation I 
history of postal reform in Great Britain is far better documentedi~J 
12 The relative unimportance of the railroad to the electric telegraph. 
in the pre-.Civil War era has been recently underscored in an exem 
Benjamin Schwantes (2008). • l} 
13 Both networks were also dependent on large numbers of seml·sklllGd.4\Vijk@J~la~ 
that is too often overlooked (Downey. .2002). "' ''fll>rl'\'$!~1 '{lb 
14 The characterization of Western Union as a "natural monopoly'':p~l"il1hbr11pSoh 
with a convenient bookend for his monograph on the early te1e&raphtW5t,ness« For 
• Chandler, in contrast, the natural monopoly hypothesis enabled hlm.IO'!!lide>tl\e'1ihorny 
interpretative issues raised by the c<>ntinuing competitive challenge tha~ WesternMnion 
would ·in the post-1866 period 'confront. On the limitations of Chandler's argument, see 
DuBoff and Herman (1980): The post-1866 competitive challenge was· analyzed by 
Grodinsky (1957) and underplayed by Klein (1986). 
15 The economic benefits of weather reporting can be measured by comparing the number 
of shipwrecks on the Great Lakes that occurred in periods during which the govern-
ment's weather-reporting service was in operation with the number of shipwrecks that 
occurred in periods during which the service had been suspended (Craft, 1998):: ·,, •, 
16 The related yet distinct and in some ways antithetical contention that the business 
strategy- of- ·corporate managers- shaped the !organizational structure of the modem 
corporation was popularized in the 1960s by business historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. 
Chand.lees contention:-had the- effect, -as was its• intention, of depoliticizing managerial 
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, contrary, highlights the centrality for the history of communications not only of politics. 
\bttt: Also of.the -state. For a related discussion; see John (2008). 
1•7.· ·:n'Ji(l:importance of rhe competitive period (1894-1907) in hastening the popularization 
f~·> ··.!9f.the telephone has been emphasized by.a number of telephone-history revisionists, 
f·.":' 'beginning with R. Gabel (1969), and continuing with Lipartito (1989, 1994, 1997), 
... . Mueller (1993, 1997), and D. Gabel (1994). The achievement of these scholars - and, in 
_j',· 
i~'-·: particular, of Mueller and Lipartito - in directing our attention ·to this oft-neglected 
f•. 
moment in telephone history is undeniable. Yet it is one thing to Tecognize the .signifi· 
f;.· cance of this competitive interlude· in hastening the popularization of the telephone, 
_ '1 · and another to discount the inflllence on· telephorie popularization of other fa:·crors, 
including, in particular, the investment strategy of big-city Bell operating companies and 
the political contests over municipal franchises in which ·these operating companies 
became embroiled, contests in which rival operating Companies almost never posed a 
major competitive challenge. 
18 The best introduction to rate-and-entry regulation in ·the late_ nineteenth-.centuty telc~ 
phone business remains Horwitz (1989). See also Armstrong and Nelles (1986), D. Gabel 
(1995), and Maguire (2000). 
19 The continuing significance of metropolitan networks in communications history is a 
theme of Graham and Marvin (ZOO!). 
20 The mistaken presumption that ordinary citizens preferred flat rates to measured Service 
has been subtly reinforced by rhe popularity of flat-rate pricing schemes fur rhe users 
of Internet service providers. 
21 The United States-Canada comparison is developed systematically in McDougall (2004). 
See also Armstrong and NelleS:(l~86); The Canadian political economy was significantly 
different from- the us: political\eCohomy· and -sO tOo-·were the· business strategies of US 
and Canadian telephone operating,cOtnpariieS1tFor_.tlili-1reasori:, it'is risky to generalize 
about telephone service in.US·,dties:by Using.evidence drawn·:from-Canadian cities. In 
America Calling, for example, Claude -Fischer (1992, pp. 54'-561 Ch. '3) relied in part on a 
recent monograph on Canadian telephone service to geheralize .about telephone usage 
patterns in the United -States:- In. so do~g. he underestiinated the innovativeness of big· 
city telephone operating companies and exaggerated rhe agency of female telephone 
users. A further problemwirh Fischer's analysis stemmed from his reliance on American 
Telephone and Telegraph institutional public service announcements as a proxy for 
corporate opinion. Unlike rhe sales-oriented advertisements sponsored by big-city Bell 
operating companies, these ·public service :announcements were ,intended neither to 
expand the market for-telephone service, nor to-read). the ordinary.- telephone users who 
made rhe vast majority of telephone calls and generated rhe bulk of Bell's revenue. 
22 The Bell public relations campaign is described injohn (ZOlOa, Ch. U) and Marchand 
(1998, Ch. 2). 
Jl .. .ll 
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